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RESPECTING NONUNION MEMBER
EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS WHILE AVOIDING A
FREE RIDE, LEHNERT v. FERRIS FACULTY
ASSOCIATION 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the history of United States labor law, the guiding
principle has been the protection of employees' rights.2 The primary
protector of employees' rights has been labor unions and as these
unions have developed and grown, employees gradually have been
able to attain better wages, hours, and working conditions Unions
were able to accomplish faster results by becoming the exclusive
collective bargaining agents of employees. 4 Nonetheless, a situation
occasionally arises where an employee does not want to become a
member of the union.' "Our First Amendment jurisprudence therefore
recognizes a correlation between the rights and the duties of the union, on the one hand, and the nonunion members of the bargaining
unit, on the other." 6 "The designation of a union as exclusive representative carries with it great responsibilities." 7 The union is obliged

1. 111 S. CL 1950 (1991).
2. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988); Railway Labor Act,

45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1988).
3. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 760 (1961) (proclaiming that "Congress has given the unions a clearly defined and delineated role to play in
effectuating the basic congressional policy of stabilizing labor relations in the industry").
4. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220 (1977) (concluding that "the
principle of exclusive union representation, which underlies the National Labor Relations Act
as well as the Railway Labor Act, is a central element in the congressional structuring of
industrial relations"); Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S.
50, 62-63 (1975); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967); Medo Photo
Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1944); Virginia R. Co. v. System Fed'n No.
40, 300 U.S. 515, 545-49 (1937). Furthermore, the designation of one union as the exclusive
representative eliminates the problems that would arise from several unions representing employees and enforcing collective bargaining agreements. Abood, 431 U.S. at 220.
5. See, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991); Ellis v. Railway
Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Railway
Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.
740 (1961); Railway Employees' Dep't, v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
6. Lehnert, Ill S. Ct. at 1978 (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,
221 (1977)).
7. Abood, 431 U.S. at 221.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

1

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 8
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 10: 1

"fairly and equitably to represent all employees ... , union and

nonunion," within the relevant unit.' In addition to its obligations,
the union is concerned with the problem of "free riders" and the lack
of support the "free riders" provide to the union." "Free riders" are
those who "refuse to contribute to the union while obtaining benefits0
of union representation that necessarily accrue to all employees."'
On the other hand, nonunion member employees are concerned with
their rights in the context of being compelled to support the union."1
The question of whether these nonunion member employees should
have to support a union they do not want, needs to be addressed. "To
be required to help finance the union as a collective-bargaining agent
might well be thought, therefore, to interfere in some way with an
employee's freedom to associate for the advancement of ideas, or to
refrain from doing so, as he sees fit." 12 A balance needs to be

achieved between the union and these nonunion member employees
so that the objecting employees do not receive a "free ride." However, at the same time, rules or measures need to be set in place so that
unions cannot take advantage of these nonunion member employees
who are required to contribute to the collective bargaining agent.
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n13 addresses the problems created
by an agency shop14 arrangement when nonunion member employees

8. Abood, 431 U.S. at 221 (quoting International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740, 761 (1961)).
9. See Michael S. Mitchell, Public Sector Union Security: The Impact of Abood, 29
LAn. L.J. 697, 699 (1978); Annette C. Burt, Note, Public Sector Labor Relations: Union
Security Agreements in the Public Sector Since Abood, 33 S.C. L. REV. 521, 524 (1982).
10. Abood, 431 U.S. at 222. See Roger C. Hartley, Constitutional Values and the Adjudication of Taft-Hartley Act Dues Objector Cases, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (1989) (stating that
unions assert "that everyone receiving the benefit of union representation should pay a fair
share of its cost, and that modern collective bargaining costs extend well beyond traditional
bargaining table activities"); Mitchell, supra note 9, at 699; Burt, supra note 9, at 524. This
lack of contribution often leads to tension between union members and those employees who
do not pay dues to the collective bargaining agent.
11. See Kenneth Cloke, Mandatory Political Contributions and Union Democracy, 4
INDUS. REL. L.J. 527, 532 (1981); Roger C. Hartley, Constitutional Values and the Adjudication of Taft-Hartley Act Dues Objector Cases, 41 HAsTiNGs L.J. 1, 2 n.7 (1989); see also
Ri. Staaf & E.G. West, Paying for Compulsory Union Services: The Entanglement Consequences of Agency Shops in the Public Sector, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 359, 362-64 (1981)
(concluding that compelled affiliation with a union through mandatory contributions invades
first amendment interests).
12. Abood, 431 U.S. at 222.
13. 111 S. CL 1950 (1991).
14. An agency shop arrangement is a union security provision that requires nonunion
employees to pay union fees and dues, but it does not require actual union membership.
Developments in the Law: Public Employment, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1611, 1726 n.1 (1984).
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Lehnert v. FerrisFaculty Association

object to certain uses of their compelled service fee.15 The petitioners in Lehnert were members of the Ferris State College16 faculty
and objected to certain uses 7 of their service fee by the unions.18
As a part of the collective bargaining agreement between the union,
Ferris Faculty Association (FFA), and Ferris State College, both parties agreed to include an agency-shop provision"' in the

15. Lehnert, III S. Ct. at 1954-55.
16. Ferris State College is an agency and arm of the State of Michigan, established by
the state's constitution and required to be funded by the state. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Ass'n-MEA-NEA, 643 F. Supp. 1306, 1308 n.1 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (referring to MICH.
CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (1979)).
17. See infra notes 79-136 and accompanying text.
18. Lehnert, 111 S. CL at 1956.
19. The agency shop provision of the collective bargaining agreement for 1981-1984 provides in pertinent part:
A. Each employee covered by the negotiated Agreement between the Board of
Control of Ferris State College and the Ferris Faculty Association (Dated November 19, 1981) shall, as a condition of employment, on or before thirty-one (31)
days from the date of commencement of professional duties or July 1, 1981,
whichever is later, join the Ferris Faculty Association or pay a service fee to the
Association equivalent to the amount of dues uniformly required of members of the
Ferris Faculty Association, less any amounts not permitted by law; provided, however, that the bargaining unit member may authorize payroll deduction for such
fee. In the event that a bargaining unit member shall not pay such service fee
directly to the Association or authorize payment through payroll deduction, the
College shal at the request of the Association, deduct the service fee from the
bargaining unit member's salary and remit the same to the Association under the
procedure provided below.
B. The procedure in all cases of non-payment of the service fee shall be as follows:
1. The Association shall notify the bargaining unit member of non-compliance
by certified mail, return receipt requested, explaining that he or she is delinquent in not tendering the service fee, specifying the current amount of the
delinquency, and warning him or her that unless the delinquent service fees are
paid or a properly executed deduction form is tendered within fourteen (14)
days, he or she shall be reported to the College and a deduction of service fee
shall be made from his or her salary.
2. If the bargaining unit member fails to comply, the Association shall give a
copy of the letter sent to the delinquent bargaining unit member and the following written notice to the College at the end of the fourteen (14) day period:
The Association certifies that (name) has failed to tender the periodic service
fee required as a condition of employment under the 1981-84 Faculty Agreement and demands that under the terms of this Agreement, the College shall
deduct the delinquent service fees from the collective bargaining unit member's
salary. The Association certifies that the amount of the service fee includes
only those items authorized by law.
3. The College upon receipt of said notice and request for deduction, shall act
pursuant to Section A above. In the event of compliance at any time prior to
deduction, the request for deduction will be withdrawn. The Association in
enforcing this provision, agrees not to discriminate between bargaining unit
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agreement.2" The provision required all employees who were part of
the bargaining unit, but not part of the union, FFA, to pay a service
fee2 I equivalent to the amount of dues required of union members. 2
Faced with compelled support to the union, the petitioners in
Lehnert instituted an action in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan. The dissenting employees asserted
that their service fees were being used for purposes" other than the
negotiation and administration of a collective bargaining agreement. 25
The petitioners asserted that a violation of their rights secured by the

members.
C. With respect to all sums deducted by the College pursuant to this Article, The
College agrees promptly to disburse said sums directly to the Association.
D. Bargaining unit members paying the service fee provided for herein or whose
service fees have been deducted by the College from their salaries may object to
the use of their service fee for matters not permitted by law. The procedure for
making such objections is that officially adopted by the Association. A copy of the
Association policy will be provided by the Association upon a request of a bargaining unit member.
F. This Article shall be effective for each academic year of this Agreement and all
sums payable hereunder shall be determined from the beginning of each academic
year. Persons becoming members of the collective bargaining unit during the course
of an academic year shall have their service fee prorated over the academic year.
I. The Association will certify at least annually to the College, fifteen (15) days
prior to the date of the first payroll deduction for professional fees or service
fees, . . . the amount of the service fee to be deducted by the College, and that
said service fee includes only those amounts permitted by the Agreement and by
law.
J. Should the provisions of 2.6, Agency Shop, be found contrary to law as a result
of a final decision from which no appeal is processed, and which is binding on
the parties of this Agreement, the parties agree to meet on written request of either
party to negotiate to bring Section 2.6 into compliance with any such final decision, such negotiations to be limited to the provisions of Section 2.6 and will not
affect the terms and conditions of this Agreement which shall remain in full effect
for the life of this Agreement.
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n-MEA-NEA, 643 F. Supp. 1306, 1308 n.3 (W.D. Mich. 1986)
(referring to Section 2.6, Agency Shop, of the union defendants' exhibit I).
20. Lehnert, 111 S. CL at 1955.
21. The service fee for the 1981-82 period amounted to $284.00. The breakdown of this
service fee provided the local union, Ferris Faculty Association (FFA), with $24.80; the state
union, Michigan Education Association, with $211.20; and the national union, National Education Association, with $48.00. Id. at 1955-56. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text
for a further discussion of the interaction between the three unions.
22. Id. at 1955.
23. Id. at 1956.
24. See infra notes 112-69 and accompanying text.
25. Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1956.
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2 7 Amendments of the United States ConstituFirst26 and Fourteenth
28
occurred.
tion had
Lehnert provided an excellent opportunity for the Supreme Court
to examine the parameters of the agency shop arrangement and an
interesting opportunity to explore the limits of the chargeabilty of
union nonmember dissenters. This note will first explore how the
Supreme Court has addressed this issue in the past29 and will then
examine the Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n 30 decision to determine
how the law has developed in this area.3

I.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHTS OF UNION NONMEMBER

EMPLOYEES IN THE CONTEXT OF COMPULSORY UNION
DUES AND FEES.

Prior to Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n32 , the Supreme Court
had considered dissenting nonunion members' objections to the
union's uses of their dues.33 A series of Supreme Court cases have
evolved in this agency shop arrangement area with the parameters of
what is permissible being preliminarily established.' By looking at
the progression of the law in this area, a more thorough understanding of Lehnert will be obtained.

26. The First Amendment provides that:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
27. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the priviledges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
28. Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1956.
29. See infra notes 32-95 and accompanying text.
30. Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. 1950.
31. See infra notes 102-69 and accompanying text.
32. 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991).
33. See infra notes 35-95 and accompanying text.
34. See Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Abood v. Detroit Ed. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209 (1977); Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Railway Employees* Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S.
225 (1956).
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A. A Preliminary Look at the Implications of Agency Shop
Arrangements: Railway Employees' Department v. Hanson
Within the context of the Railway Labor Act35, Railway
Employees' Department v. Hanson3 6 was the first case which considered the constitutional dimensions of an agency shop agreement. 7
Claiming that a union shop agreement violated their first amendment rights, the petitioners in Hanson challenged a provision38 of
the Railway Labor Act. 39 However, the Hanson court rejected the
employees' claim and upheld the Railway Labor Act as a valid exercise of the power by Congress under the Commerce Clause. 40 Noting that the required financial support related to the union's work in

35. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1988).
36. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
37. Id.
38. Section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act provides:
ELEVENTH. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, or of any other
statute or law of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State, any carrier or carriers as defined in this chapter and a labor organization or labor organizations duly designated and authorized to represent employees in accordance with the
requirements of this chapter shall be permitted(a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that
within sixty days following the beginning of such employment, or the effective
date of such agreements, whichever is the later, all employees shall become members of the labor organization representing their craft or class: Provided, That no
such agreement shall require such condition of employment with respect to employees to whom membership is not available upon the same terms and conditions as
are generally applicable to any other member or with respect to employees to
whom membership was denied or terminated for any reason other than the failure
of the employee to tender the periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not
including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or
retaining membership.
(b) to make agreements providing for the deduction by such carrier or carriers
from the wages of its or their employees in a craft or class and payment to the
labor organization representing the craft or class of such employees, of any periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership: Provided, That no
such agreement shall be effective with respect to any individual employee until he
shall have furnished the employer with a written assignment to the labor organization of such membership dues, initiation fees, and assessments, which shall be
revocable in writing after the expiration of one year or upon the termination date
of the applicable collective agreement, whichever occurs sooner . ...
45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1988).
39. See Hanson, 351 U.S. at 228.
40. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238. See Norman L. Cantor, Uses and Abuses of the Agency
Shop, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 61, 66 (1983) (noting that Congress upheld the 'promotion
of union security provisions as a 'stabilizing force' in industrial relations").
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collective bargaining41 , the Hanson court held that requiring financial
support for collective bargaining by those who receive its benefits
does not violate the First or the Fifth Amendments.42
Nevertheless, in addressing the union security issue, the Hanson
court also stated that "[i]f 'assessments' are in fact imposed for purposes not germane to collective bargaining, a different problem would
be presented."43 This situation of "assessments" being used for purposes not "germane" to collective bargaining arises in Lehnert."
Consequently, the Hanson decision provides the foundation upon
which further discussion of union security issues grows.
B.

Compelled Ideological and Political Association,
InternationalAss'n of Machinists v. Street

Although not addressed in the Hanson decision, the question of
the chargeability of compelled ideological and political association
first arose in InternationalAss'n of Machinists v. Street.15 In Street,
the employees, who were operating under the same Railway Labor
Act provision" that was present in Hanson, charged that the compelled union fees they were paying were, in substantial part, being
used to finance the political doctrines and ideologies of the union. 7
Before addressing the political association question, the Street
court reaffirmed the Hanson decision, finding that "the requirements
for financial support of the collective-bargaining agency by all of
those who receive the benefits of its work is within the power of
Congress under the Commerce Clause and does not violate either the
First or the Fifth Amendments." ' The Street court then went on to
note that it had not passed on the issue of using union service fees
for political causes in Hanson."9 Upon examining the record, the
Street court determined that it contained detailed information of 5the
0
union utilizing the nonmember dissenters' fees for political causes.

41.

Hanson, 351 U.S. at 235.

42.

Id. at 238.

43. Id. at 235.
44. See infra notes 124-42 and accompanying text.
45. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
46. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
47. Street, 367 U.S. at 744.
48. Street, 367 U.S. at 749 (quoting Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225,
238 (1956)). See Hartley, supra note 11, at 19.
49. Street, 367 U.S. at 749.
50. Id. at 748; see also Cantor, supra note 40, at 67.
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Consequently, the Street court held that unions using the dissenting employees' service fee "to support candidates for public office,
and advance political programs, is not a use which helps defray the
expenses of the negotiation or administration of collective agreements,
or the expenses entailed in the adjustment of grievances and disputes.""' Accordingly, this use by the union "falls clearly outside the
reasons advanced by the unions and accepted by Congress [as to]
why authority to make union-shop agreements was justified."52
Street provides a solid foundation and a strong indication to the
approach the Court eventually takes in Lehnert with regard to union
lobbying.53 Compelled ideological and political association are closely tied to lobbying, hence, it is no surprise that the Lehnert Court
does not allow unions to use dissenting employees' service fees for
54
these purposes when they are not germane to collective bargaining.
C.

The "Germane to Collective Bargaining"
Test, Railway Clerks v. Allen

The final case in the initial trilogy of Railway Labor Act cases
is Railway Clerks v. Allen.55 Once again, Section 2, Eleventh of the
Railway Labor Act 56 was at at issue. The nonunion railroad employees in Allen objected to political expenditures by the union.57 The
Allen Court noted that nonunion dissenters could only be charged for
expenditures "germane to collective bargaining."58 Thus, the Court
deemed it necessary in future cases to draw a boundary between
59
political expenditures and those germane to collective bargaining.
One important step that the Allen Court took in refining the
principles regarding recovery of their service fee was reducing the
employees' burden by demanding that there only be a general objection to the service fee's use.' This differed from the Court's earlier
approach in Street, where more specific objections were required.61

51. Id. at 768.
52. Id.
53. See infra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
55. 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
56. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
57. Allen, 373 U.S. at 118.
58. Id. at 121.
59. Id. The idea that the Supreme Court was trying to establish is that a close tie to
collective bargaining is needed in order to justify charging nonunion member employees.
60. Id.
61. See Street, 367 U.S. at 774-775.
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The Allen Court noted that "[ilt would be impracticable to require a
dissenting employee to allege and prove each distinct union political
expenditure to which he objected." 62 As a result, "it is enough that
[the dissenter] 63manifests his opposition to any political expenditures
by the union.
Additionally, the Allen Court placed upon the unions the burden
of proving the proper proportion between political expenses which
were not "germane" and those expenses which were related to the
collective bargaining process. 64 The Allen Court reasoned that
"[s]ince the unions possess the facts and records from which the
proportion of political to total union expenditures can reasonably be
calculated, basic considerations of fairness compel that they [the unions], not the individual employees, bear the burden of proving such
proportion." 65 This burden of proving the proportion of political expenditures to total union expenditures may appear monumental, but it
is feasible. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court concluded that "difficult
accounting problems" will arise and that if the political activity is
germane to collective bargaining then it will be chargeable.6
D.

The Public Sector Employment Context:
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education

Abood v. Detroit Board of Education67 represents the first time
that the Court addressed the constitutionality of union security provisions in the public-employment context. 68 Faced with the issue of
whether or not a union shop arrangement authorized by a Michigan
statute!' violates the constitutional rights of government employ-

62. Allen, 373 U.S. at 118. The Supreme Court exercised good judgment in this instance
as it would not only be impracticable, but also often impossible, for the dissenting employee
to allege and prove each and every expenditure to which the employee objected, mainly
because the dissenting employee often will not know of every individual expenditure.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 122.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
68. Id.; see also Daniel R. Levinson, After Abood: Public Sector Union Security and
Protection of Individual Public Employee Rights, 27 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1977); Staaf & West,
supra note 11; Martin J. Barrington, Note, New York's Legislative Response to Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education: Agency Shop and Public Employees' Right to Freedom of Association, 43 ALB. L. REV. 567 (1979); Kelley M. Gale, Note, Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education: Association as a First Amendment Right - The Protection of the Nonmember Employee in the Context of Public Sector Unionism, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 487.
69. The Michigan law that was involved in Abood is identical to the one that is at issue
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ees 7 ° , the Abood Court followed the precedent established by the
Court's earlier decisions in Hanson", Street7 2, and Allen. 3
The Abood Court concluded that a union can "constitutionally
spend funds for the expression of political views, on behalf of
political candidates, or toward the advancement of other ideological
causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining representative."74 However, the Abood Court held that "the Constitution requires... that such expenditures be financed from charges, dues, or
assessments paid by employees who do not object to advancing those
ideas and who are not coerced into doing so
against their will by the
75
threat of loss of government employment."
In addition to the holding, the Abood Court made several other
conclusions. First, the Court noted that "[a] union shop arrangement
has been thought to distribute fairly the cost ... among those who
benefit."7 6 Second, they reasoned that "[t]o compel employees financially to support their collective bargaining representative has an
impact upon their First Amendment interests."' Third, the Court
determined that using the service charge "to finance expenditures by
the Union for the purposes of collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment," is also proper in the public context. 78 Finally, the Abood Court noted that "[p]ublic employees are
not basically different from private employees; on the whole, they
have the same
sort of skills, the same needs, and seek the same ad79
vantages."

in Lehnert. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 212 n.1; Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1955 n.1. See infra notes

104-05 and accompanying text.
70. Abood, 431 U.S. at 211.

71. See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
74. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235.
75. Id. at 235-36.
76. Id. at 221-22.
77. Id. at 222. See Staaf & West, supra note 11, at 362-64 (concluding that compelled
affiliation with a union through mandatory contributions invades first amendment interests).
78. Abood, 431 U.S. at 225-26. See Cantor, supra note 40, at 66 (acknowledging "strong
governmental interests in the agency shop as a device to spread equitably the costs of obtaining workers' benefits, and thus promote industrial stability through promoting stable and se-

cure unions").
79. Abood, 431 U.S. at 229-30. See Clyde Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: Problems
of Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 669, 670 (1975) (concluding that "[tihe
uniqueness of public employment is in the special character of the employer"). In addition,
the differences between the public and the private sectors are not so great that public employees are burdened with a greater infringement upon their First Amendment Rights when
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Additionally, the Court reasoned that drawing the line between
that which is collective bargaining related and what is simply unrelated political support may be "somewhat hazier" in the public sector."0
Therefore, in addressing the balance between the union and the dissenters, they concluded that "the objective must be to devise a way
of preventing compulsory subsidization of ideological activity by
employees who object thereto without restricting the Union's ability
to require every employee to contribute to the cost of collective bargaining activities.""1 With this objective in mind, but without a system in place, the Lehnert decision attempts to provide a solution in
the area of nonunion dissenter's service fees. 2
E. A Proposed Test for Determining the Validity
of Challenged Expenses: Ellis v. Railway Clerks
In addressing section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act 3,
Ellis v. Railway Clerks 4 passed upon the "statutory or constitutional
adequacy" of suggested remedies for refunding the dissenting nonunion members' money." The Ellis Court held that "the pure rebate
approach is inadequate."86 The Court then reasoned that "[b]y exacting and using full dues, then refunding months later the portion that
it was not allowed to exact in the first place, the union effectively
charges the employees for activities that are outside the scope of the
statutory authorization. 8 7 Thus, Ellis concluded that unions cannot
be allowed to utilize dissenter's funds for non-germane activities,
even if the use is only temporary.8
After declaring the "pure rebate approach" inadequate, the Supreme Court established a new test for determining the validity of the
challenged expenses. 9 The Court provided that "when employees
such as [the] petitioners object to being burdened with particular

charged with a union service fee. Abood, 431 U.S. at 230.
80. Id. at 236.
81. Id. at 237. See Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753-54
(1963).
82. See infra notes 102-69 and accompanying text.
83. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1988); see also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
84. 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
85. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 443.
86. Id.; see also Developments, supra note 14, at 1733 (noting that "the Court's invalidation of the union's rebate scheme is not wholly detrimental to union interests").
87. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 444.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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union expenditures, the test must be whether the challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in
dealing with the employer on labor-management issues." 90 Furthermore, Ellis reasoned that:
objecting employees may be compelled to pay their fair share of not
only the direct costs of negotiating and administering a collectivebargaining contract and of settling grievances and disputes, but also
the expenses of activities or undertakings normally or reasonably
employed to implement or effectuate the duties of the union as
exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit. 9'
Looking at the challenged expenses involved,' the Ellis Court
was faced with the issue of whether the additional infringement on
the dissenter's First Amendment rights was sufficiently supported by a
governmental interest. 93 The Court perceived little additional infringement of First Amendment rights beyond those already accepted
and nothing that is not justified by the government's interests behind
the union shop.' Finally, the Court concluded that "It]he very nature of the free-rider problem and the governmental interest in overcoming it require that the union have a certain flexibility in its use of
compelled funds.""
F. A Summary of the Precedent in the Area of Compelled
Support of Unions By Nonunion Member Employees
In establishing its test for determining the chargeability of nonunion dissenting employees, Lehnert concluded that:
Hanson and Street and their progeny teach that chargeable activities
must (1) be "germane" to the collective-bargaining activity; (2) be

90. Id. at 448.
91. Id. It is interesting to note that "[w]hen Congress authorizes an employer and a
union to enter into union-shop agreements and makes such agreements binding and enforceable over the dissents of a minority of employees or union members, it has cast the weight
of the Federal Government behind the agreements just as surely as if it had imposed them
by statute." Cantor, supra note 40, at 68.

92. The petitioners in Ellis challenged the union's expenditures in six areas: conventions,
social activities, publications, organizing, litigation, and death benefits. See Ellis, 466 U.S. at

448-55.
93. Id. at 456.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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justified by the government's vital policy interest in labor peace and
avoiding "free riders"; and (3) not significantly add to the burdening
of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of an agency or
union shop?'
Nevertheless, the aforementioned five Supreme Court cases are not
the only helpful precedent available for a discussion about agency
shops. In Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson,97 the Court determined that an agency shop arrangement is supported by the
government's interest in promoting labor peace and avoiding the free
rider problem.9" Additionally, Keller v. State Bar"' determined that
the Ellis test provided "useful guidelines for determining permissible
expenditures."" ° The numerous decisions which preceded Lehnert
allowed the Lehnert Court to expand and further define the law in the
agency shop area.101 Consequently, in addressing the chargeability
of certain union expenditures to dissenting nonunion member employees, the Lehnert Court had a solid foundation in which to make its
decision.
I1.

LEHNERT V. FERRIS FACULTY ASSOCIATION

A.

Background into Lehnert.

Lehnert presents issues concerning the constitutional limitations,
if any, upon the payment of dues by a nonmember to a union in the
public sector which is required as a condition of employment."r2
The petitioners were members of the Ferris State College faculty
during the period in question, 1981-82, and objected to the union's
use of their service fees. 3 The respondent, Ferris Faculty Association (FFA), serving as the exclusive collective bargaining representative1"t of the faculty of Michigan's Ferris State College (a public

96. Lehnert, 111 S. CLt.at 1959; see also supra notes 35-95 and accompanying text.
97. 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
98. Id. at 302-03.
99. 110 S. CL 2228 (1990).
100. Id. at 2236.
101. See Keller v. State Bar, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990); Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986); Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Railway Employees' Dep't v.
Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
102. Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1954-55.
103. Id at 1956.
104. Michigan's Public Employment Relation Act provides that a duly selected union shall
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institution) entered into an agency-shop"0 5 arrangement with the college."° This arrangement provided that the bargaining unit employees who did not want to join the FFA were required to pay the FFA
and its state and national affiliates (Michigan Education Association
(MA) and National Education Association (NEA) respectively) a service fee equivalent to a union member's dues."0 7 Discontented with

serve as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of public employees in a particular
bargaining unit. Id at 1955. The statute provides:
[riepresentatives designated for purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of
the public employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representative of all the public employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or
other conditions of employment, and shall be so recognized by the public employer . . . .
MIcH. COMP. LAws § 423.211 (1978).
105. An agency shop arrangement compels employees who decline membership in the
union to pay a service fee to the union. Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1955. The Michigan Public
Employment Relations Act allows agency shops as it provides:
[n]othing in this act or any in law of this state shall preclude a public employer
from making an agreement with an exclusive bargaining representative . . . to require as a condition of employment that all employees in the bargaining unit pay
to the exclusive bargaining representative a service fee equivalent to the amount of
dues uniformly required of members of the exclusive bargaining representative ....
RcH. CoMp. LAWS § 423.210 (1978).
106. Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1955. The agency-shop provision of the collective-bargaining
agreement for 1981-84 provided in pertinent part:
A. Each employee covered by the negotiated Agreement between the Board
of Control of Ferris State College and the Ferris Faculty Association (Dated November 19, 1981) shall, as a condition of employment, on or before thirty-one
days from the date of commencement of professional dudes or July 1, 1981,
whichever is later, join the Ferris Faculty Association or pay a service fee to the
Association equivalent to the amount of dues uniformly required of members of the
Ferris Faculty Association, less any amounts not permitted by law; provided, however, that the bargaining unit member may authorize payroll deduction for such
fee. In the event that a bargaining unit member shall not pay such service fee
directly to the Association or authorize payment through payroll deduction, the
College shall, at the request of the Association, deduct the service fee from the
bargaining unit member's salary and remit the same to the Association under the
procedure provided below ....
Id at 1955 n.3.
107. Id at 1955. Part D of the agency shop provision of the collective bargaining agreement sets forth:
Bargaining unit members paying the service fee provided for herein or
whose service fees have been deducted by the College from their salaries may
object to the use of their fee for matters not permitted by law. The procedure for
making such objections is that officially adopted by the Association. A copy of the
Association policy will be provided by the Association upon a request of a bargaining unit member.
Id at 1955 n.3.
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the uses of their service fee, the petitioners filed a civil rights action
against the Ferris Faculty Association contending that the use of the
service fee for purposes other than negotiation and administration of a
collective bargaining agreement violated the petitioners constitutional
rights under the First1l 8 and Fourteenth'09 Amendments of the
Constitution."' The petitioners' objections came in six areas, "(1)
lobbying and electoral politics; (2) bargaining, litigation, and other
activities on behalf of persons not in petitioners' bargaining unit; (3)
public relation efforts; (4) miscellaneous professional activities; (5)
meetings and conventions of the parent unions; (6) preparation for a
strike.""' By examining the Lehnert decision and arguments made
by the parties, a greater appreciation of the concept of agency-shops
will be attained.
B. Lobbying and Electoral Politics
In Lehnert, the petitioners proposed limitations on the use of the
dissenting nonunion members' contributions. The petitioners did not
want to be charged for lobbying activity that did not concern the
legislative ratification nor the fiscal appropriation of their collective
bargaining agreement 1 '
The Court of Appeals held that the unions can constitutionally
use the fees if they are "pertinent to the duties of the union as the
collective bargaining representative" 1 The Supreme Court agreed
with this observation, however in Lehnert, it reasoned that the challenged lobbying activities related not to the ratification of a
dissenter's collective-bargaining agreement, but to financial support of
the employee's profession generally, thus the connection to the
union's function as bargaining representative was too attenuated to
justify compelling objecting employees to support the union. 4 The
Court based its reasoning on the governmental interests underlying its

108. See note 26 and accompanying text.
109. See note 27 and accompanying text.
110. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 881 F.2d 1388, 1389-90 (6th Cir. 1989); see also
Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 301 (1986) (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977) and indicating that requiring nonunion member employees to support their collective bargaining representative has an impact upon their First
Amendment interests).
111. Lehnert, 111 S. CL at 1956.
112. Id at 1959.
113. Lehnert, 881 F.2d at 1392 (quoting Robinson v. New Jersey, 741 F.2d 598, 609 (3d
Cir. 1984)).
114. Lehnert, 111 S. CL at 1959-60.
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acceptance of union security arrangements, promoting labor peace and
avoiding the "free rider" problem. 1 Neither goal is served by
charging objecting employees for lobbying, electoral, and other political activities
that do not relate to their collective bargaining agree6
ment

11

It is well recognized that public employee unions typically must
lobby vigorously in order to represent their members' interests effectively." 7 Moreover, general lobbying to secure legislative assistance"' is helpful to unions in their efforts to secure rights for employees."1 9 However, the union charging the petitioners for lobbying
which is extrinsic to the collective bargaining agreement creates an
"additional interference with the First Amendment interests of [the]
objecting employees, [which is not] adequately supported by a governmental interest." 120 Additionally, the union's use of the petitioners funds for lobbying which is not collective bargaining related
would force each dissenter into being "an instrument for fostering
public adherence
to an ideological point of view which he finds unac21
ceptable."

Looking at the lobbying section of the Lehnert decision, it becomes apparent that the First Amendment concerns outweigh the
"free-rider" problems generally associated with collective bargaining
concerns. Consequently, the Lehnert Court holds "that the state constitutionally may not compel its employees to subsidize legislative lob-

115. Id at 1960; see also, Chicago Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 302-03 (1986);
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 224 (1977).
116. Id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that when compelled speech is in a public
context, the burden upon freedom of expression is particularly great. Id.
117. Developments in the Law: Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1732
(1984); see also A.L. Zwerdling, The Liberation of Public Employees: Union Security in the
Public Sector, 17 B.C. LNDUS. & COM. L. REV. 993, 1025-27 (1976); Timothy J. Hatch,
Comment, Union Security in the Public Sector: Defining Political Expenditures Related to
Collective Bargaining, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 134, 150-52; J. Albert Woll, Unions in Politics: A
Study in Law and the Workers' Needs, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 130, 142, 149 (1961) (concluding
that collective bargaining is not limited to negotiations with management and that it includes
administrative and legislative lobbying).
118. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (stating that "labor's cause often is
advanced on fronts other than collective bargaining and grievance settlement within the immediate employment context").
119. See Developments in the Law: Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1732
(1984); Hatch, supra note 117, at 152.
120. Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 456 (1984).
121. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977); see also Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at
1960; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Milis v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218 (1966); Buckley v. Valo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
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bying or other political union activities outside the limited context of
contract ratification or implementation."' 22 Additionally, the portions
of the Teacher's Voice which reports about lobbying or political
activities may not be supported by the funds of objecting employees.1" This portion of the Lehnert decision appeals to a sense of
fairness which is needed in the agency shop context. It also allows
both union and nonunion employees the freedom to lobby and support
the political ideologies of their choice.
C.

Bargaining, Litigation, and Other Activities on Behalf of
Persons not in the Petitioners' Bargaining Unit.

One of the more important questions decided in Lehnert dealt
with whether the petitioners could be charged for union activities not
directly undertaken for the benefit of their unit. The Supreme Court
has consistently held that charges "germane to collective bargaining"124 are chargeable, however, it has never required a direct relationship between the expenses and some tangible benefits to the
petitioner's bargaining unit."z
Requiring a direct connection would be detrimental to the unified-membership structure under which many unions operate. 26 In
addition, "[t]he essence of the affiliation1 2 ' relationship is the notion
that the parent will bring to bear its often considerable economic,
political, and informational resources when the local is in need of
them." 128 The idea is that even if the money paid by the local union to the national is not utilized during the particular membership

122. Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1960-61. The Supreme Court acknowledged that labor peace
would not be especially served by allowing charges in this area, because unlike collective
bargaining negotiations between the union and management, political discourse is usually in a
public forum which is open to all. Id. at 1960. To require the objecting employees to
fmacially support the unions political activities would not further the cause of harmonious
industrial relations. Id.
123. Id. at 1963.
124. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 235.
125. Lehnert, 111 S. CL at 1961.
126. Id. (stating additionally that "membership in the local union constitutes membership
in the state and national parent organizations"); see also Cumero v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 778 P.2d 174, 192 (Cal. 1989) (highlighting the inherent "close organizational relationship").
127. See Bridgeport-Spaulding Community Sch., 1986 MERC Op. 1024, 1057 (explaining
that restricting "chargeability to only those activities directly related to the local bargaining

unit is to totally ignore the fact of affiliation"); Garden City Sch. Dist., 1978 MERC Op.
1145, 1155-66.
128. Lehnert, 111 S. CL at 1961.
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year it9 has still served as insurance for the bargaining unit's protection.

12

Realizing that costs arise beyond those used directly for negotiating, administering, and handling grievances and disputes, the Ellis
Court noted that "objecting employees may be compelled to pay...
the expenses of activities or undertakings normally or reasonably
employed to implement or effectuate the duties of the union as exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit. " "'s
Consequently, the Lehnert Court concluded "that a local bargaining representative may charge objecting employees for their pro rata
share of the costs associated with otherwise chargeable activities of its
state and national affiliates, even if those activities were not performed for the direct benefit of the objecting employees' bargaining
unit."' 3 ' However, it is important to note that the union cannot use
the dissenters' service fee without limitation. 32 The payment to the
state133 and national affiliates'" must be for services that may
take effect to benefit the local union by virtue of its affiliation with
the parent organization.'3 5
Proving the proportion of chargeable expenses to total expenses
remains the union's responsibility." Lehnert merely concludes that
the union does not have
to prove a "direct and tangible impact" upon
37
the petitioners' unit.

Despite being allowed to charge objecting employees for activities which do not directly benefit them, Lehnert held that "the expenses of litigation that does not concern the dissenting employees'
3
bargaining unit" is not chargeable to the dissenting employees. 1
The prior precedent of the Court has established that litigation on

129. Id. It is true that quite often the economic and political powers of the parent union
are not needed by the local union. Nevertheless, the security provided by the parent is warmly embraced by the local union.
130. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448.
131. Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1961.
132. Id.
133. In Lehnert, the state affiliate of the Ferris Faculty Association (FFA), which the
petitioners belong, is the Michigan Education Association (MEA). /, at 1955.
134. The national affiliate of Ferris Faculty Association and Michigan Education Association is the National Education Association. Id.
135. Id at 1961-62.
136. Id at 1962; see also Chicago Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 306 (1986);
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 239-40 n.40 (1977); Railway Clerks v. Allen,
373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963).
137. Lehnert, 111 S. CL at 1962.
138. Id. at 1963.
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139
behalf of one bargaining unit may ultimately benefit another unit.

Nevertheless, the Court found the "extra-unit litigation to be more
akin to lobbying in both kind and effect."' 14 As a result, the Court
reasoned that union litigation could cover a wide range of activities.4' Thus, Lehnert concluded that "[w]hen unrelated to an objecting employee's unit, such activities are not germane to the union's
duties as exclusive bargaining representative." t42
By predicating the charging of nonunion member employees as
to whether or not such activities are germane to the union's duties as
an exclusive bargaining agent, the Supreme Court sought to protect
the objecting employees' rights in this area. While defining an
activitity as germane gives rise to difficulties, the objecting employees
are now provided with yet another shield for their interaction with the
union.
D.

Public Relation Expenditures

The next area the petitioners objected to was the union's use of
their service fee in the area of public relation expenditures."
In
Lehnert, the public relation expenditures were the type that were
designed to enhance the reputation of the teaching profession.'"
Analogizing the public relation expenditures to lobbying, the
Lehnert Court found that the public relation activities "entailed speech
of a political nature in a public forum." 45 Moreover, the Court determined that "public speech in support of the teaching profession
generally is not sufficiently related to the union's collective-bargaining
functions to justify compelling dissenting employees to support
it.""4 Consequently, Lehnert differed from the Court of Appeals 47

139. Id. The idea implicit in this assertion is that one bargaining unit's success in litigation will relieve another bargaining unit from having to pursue litigation.

140. Id.
141. Id. at 1963-64.
142. Id. at 1964. The Supreme Court is concerned that charging the objecting employees
in this context would be financing the union past the point where the objecting employees
are receiving a benefit.
143. Id.
144. Lehnert, 881 F.2d at 1394.
145. Lehnert, 111 S. CL at 1964.
146. Id.
147. Id. The Court of Appeals compared the public relation expenditures (which covered
informational picketing, media exposure, signs, posters, and buttons) to the costs of union
social activities which the Ellis Court declared to be chargeable to dissenters. Id.; see also
Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 449-56 (1984); Lehnert, 881 F.2d at 1394; Lebnert v.
Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 643 F. Supp. 1306, 1313 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
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in concluding that a substantial burden upon First Amendment rights
beyond those already incurred, occurs when dissenters are charged
with public relation expenditures.14
At first glance, it may look foolish for the objecting employees
not to want to enhance the public's perception of the teaching profession. Nevertheless, it appears that the objecting employees simply
want to enhance the teaching profession in their own words and not
through the union's voice. Taken in this light, the Supreme Court is
simply ensuring that these nonunion member employees have a
chance to voice their own opinions without having to support the
union's opinion.
E. Miscellaneous Professional Activities: Programs Securing
Funds for Public Education in Michigan and the
Publications which Report on Such Activities.
Addressing the issue of miscellaneous professional activities, the
Supreme Court followed the decisions of the District Court and the
Court of Appeals. 149 Both of the lower courts allowed "charges for
those portions of the Teacher's Voice that concern teaching and education generally, professional development, unemployment, job opportunities, award programs of the MEA, and other miscellaneous matters." 150
Lehnert determined these informational support services are neither "political or public" in nature.' 5 ' The Court went on to reason
that despite the fact that these services do not directly concern the
dissenters' bargaining unit, "these expenditures are for the benefit of
all" 5 2 and there is "no additional infringement of First Amendment
rights.""' Lehnert based its decision on the fact that the miscellaneous expenses were "de minimis" in nature."5 The Supreme Court
made a practical decision concerning these expenditures. Taking into
account the "de minimis" nature of the expenses, the benefits avail-

148. Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1964.
149. Id.; see also Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 881 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir. 1989).
150. Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1964.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.; see also Ellis, 466 U.S. at 456 (addressing the chargeability of de minimis social activities). The Lehnert Court agreed with the Court of Appeals analogy that was drawn
between the miscellaneous expenditures and the social activities present in Ellis. Lehnert, 111
S. Ct. at 1964.
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369

able to all far outweigh the cost of supporting these expenses.
F. Meetings and Conventions of the Parent Union
The next issue which Lehnert addressed is whether unions may
constitutionally require dissenting nonmember employees to subsidize
the participation in state and national conventions by delegates from
the local union. 55
Lehnert held that the unions may charge the dissenting nonmember employees. 156 The Court determined that the fact "the conventions were not solely devoted to the activities of the FFA does not
prevent the unions from requiring petitioner's support. 7 Furthermore, Lehnert concluded that the First Amendment does not mandate
such a close connection. 15 Additionally, the Court supported its decision by stating that "participation by members of the local in the
formal activities of the parent is likely to be an important benefit of
affiliation." 5 9 The Supreme Court makes a clear determination that
convention expenses are chargeable with the underlying understanding
that the local union will receive a benefit from the convention which
will have a positive effect on collective bargaining negotiations between the local union and management.
G. Preparation for a Strike
The final area of dispute in Lehnert was the union charging the
petitioners for preparation for a strike."6 In negotiating the collective bargaining agreement in the fiscal year 1981-82, the union perceived negotiations to be ineffective and thus began a "job action" to
prepare to go out on strike.16 ' A crisis center was created.162

155. Id.
156. Id. at 1965.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. Bargaining strategies and representational policies are often established at these
conventions. It often benefits the local union to use the national union's experience so that
the local union can bargain more effectively.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.; see also Lehnert, 643 F. Supp. at 1313 (finding that "whatever label is attached
to this facility, prior to a strike it serves as a meeting place for the local's membership, a
base from which tactical activities such as informational picketing can be conducted, and
serves to apply additional pressure on the employer by suggesting, whether true or not, that
the local is prepared to strike if necessary-).
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Both sides concede that if the strike actually took place it would
have been illegal under Michigan Law. 63 Furthermore, Lehnert determined that the union could not have charged the petitioners for expenses related to an illegal strike." In making its determination,
the Court reasoned that "no legitimate governmental interest...
would be served by compelling objecting employees to subsidize
activity that the State has chosen to disallow."1 6 However, the
Court noted that the petitioners did not identify any law which stated
"that mere preparation for an illegal strike is itself illegal or against
public policy." 1"
Accepting the rationale set forth by the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court allowed the expenditures for strike preparation to be
charged to the dissenters because they were reasonable bargaining
tools. The Court reasoned that "these expenses are substantively indistinguishable from those appurtenant to collective-bargaining negotiations." 1" Hence, Lehnert concluded that the strike related expenses
aid in the negotiations and provide a direct benefit to the dissenters. 6 Therefore, the 69union may charge the dissenters for the costs
of strike preparation.1
It appears that the Supreme Court is taking a quite liberal approach in allowing the union to charge nonunion member employees
for the preparation of a strike - which if ever actually undertaken
would be illegal. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court points out the
effective nature this strike preparation has on collective bargaining
negotiations. The burden that is placed on the shoulders of the objecting employees is not outweighed by the benefits these employees
receive. Thus, even though at first glance the charging may seem

163. Michigan's Public Employment Relation Act provides that:
[n]o person holding a position by appointment or employment in the government
of the state of Michigan, or in the government of any 1 or more of the political
subdivisions thereof, or in the public school service, or in any public or special
district, or in the service of any authority, commission, or board, or in any other
branch of the public service, hereinafter called a "public employee," shall strike.
MICH. CoMP. LAws § 423.202 (1979).
164. Lehnert, III S. Ct. at 1965.
165. Id.; see also Male v. Grand Rapids Educ. Ass'n, 295 N.W.2d 918 (Mich. App.
1980) (holding that compulsory service fees under Michigan law cannot include money which

is allocated to support public sector strikes).
166. Lehnert, III S. Ct. at 1965.
167. Id. The Supreme Court makes an interesting point by asserting that only one out of
every seven or eight strike preparations actually cumulates in a strike. Ida
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1966.
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unfair, it is actually legitimate provided that good faith negotiations
are taking place on behalf of the union.
IV.

JusTcE SCALIA'S DISSENT AND THE IMPOSITION
OF THE STATUTORY DUTIES TEST

Although agreeing with the Court's decision pertaining to many
of the challenged expenditures, Justice Scalia views the test the Court
utilizes in Lehnert as ineffective. 7 ° Justice Scalia posits that he
"would hold that contributions can be compelled only for the costs of
the union's statutory duties as exclusive bargaining
performing
171
agent."
In his dissent, Justice Scalia sees problems with the majority's
three part test' 2 involving "germaneness", "governmental policy interest", and "burdens on free speech." 73 Specifically, Justice Scalia
the implicit "judgement call" which each of the three parts
questions
174
creates.
Therefore, Justice Scalia "would hold that to be constitutional a
charge must at least be incurred in performance of the union's statutory duties." 75 Consequently, Justice Scalia asserts that he "would
make explicit what has been implicit in [Supreme Court] cases since
Street: a union cannot constitutionally charge nonmembers for any expenses except those incurred for the conduct of activities in which the
union owes a duty of fair representation to the nonmembers being
176
charged."
Justice Scalia then went on to apply his statutory duties test to
the Lehnert expenditures.' 77 In determining that both the public relation expenditures and the lobbying expense were nonchargeable, Justice Scalia reasoned that they were not part of the collective bargaining process. 7 ' Analogously, Justice Scalia does not agree with the
Court's decision to charge the nonmembers for the miscellaneous

170. Id. at 1975 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171. Id.
172. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
173. Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1975 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. Id. Justice Scalia highlights the problem that future courts will have to address.
Without defining what is "germane," "justified," and "additional burden," a nebulous standard
has been created which will simply serve to perpetuate litigation. Id.
175. Id. at 1979.
176. Id.

177. Id.
178. Id. at 1980.
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matters. 79 Next, Justice Scalia determined that union attendance at
all conventions is not properly chargeable, however, there may be
some meetings which are relevant to the union's bargaining responsibilities which would be chargeable."
Finally, Justice Scalia would
not allow the union to charge the dissenters for preparing for a strike
because in this situation the union is not acting "in its capacity as the
government appointed bargaining agent for all employees. "l
V.

CONCLUSION

Entering the twenty-first century, accountability for spending is
coming to the forefront of most economic discussion. The 1992 Presidential candidates all incorporated this concept into their messages.
Consequently, the field of labor relations is also incorporating this
idea.
Employees face problems such as employer cutbacks, layoffs,
and the ever increasing cost of living. Employees need unions to
continue to play the vital role which they have for years, but now the
unions must be monitored to ensure that their actions are in furtherance of collective bargaining.
Lehnert attempts to address the questions that arise in this difficult area of labor relation law.1s2 Although the three part test"8 3
which the Supreme Court established may involve difficulties in application, it nevertheless appeals to a needed sense of fairness. Justice
Scalia is perceptive in forecasting difficulties in applying the
majority's test. However, Lehnert adds to the foundation that the
numerous cases before it had established. Each aspect of the Lehnert

179. Id.; see also supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia did not understand how these expenditures could be upheld under the test the Lehnert Court proports to
use. Moreover, Justice Scalia explains the differences between the de minimis social activities
in Ellis and the Lehnert expenditures. Justice Scalia reasoned that the social expenditures in
Ellis were not only de minimis in amount, but also in First Amendment impact. The miscellaneous expenditures in Lehnert, however, all deal with items that are "inherently communicative". Lehnert, 111 S.CL at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Ellis, 466 U.S. at 456 (1984).
180. Lehnert, III S. CL at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 1981.
182. For a further discussion concerning Lehnert and an extensive discussion of the legislative history involved in the area of agency shop arrangements, see Calvin Siemer, Comment: Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association: Accounting To Financial Core Members: Much
A-Dues About Nothing?, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 1057 (1992).
183. The three part test established by the majority in Lehnert basically involves the
question of "germaneness," the governmental policy interest, and the burdens which the expenditure places on free speech. Lehnert, 111 S. CL at 1959.
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holding addresses yet another issue in the agency shop area.' s4
Emotions are extremely high in the context of charging nonunion
member employees compulsory union dues because the unions are
seeking support for their work which they argue is "germane" to
collective bargaining. Additionally, the conflicting political interests of
allowing free choice while avoiding the union nonmember dissenters
receiving a "free ride" are at work making this an extremely pivotal
labor issue. Although Lehnert answers many questions, the work of
defining terms, such as "germaneness" and the term's relationship to
collective bargaining, will continue to be open to debate and discussion for years. Unequivical answers are not given by the Lehnert
decision, but a clearer understanding of what is chargeable to nonunion member employees is gained.
Charles J. Ogeka

184.

See supra notes 112-169 and accompanying text.
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